Author: HHS Contributor

Review: Social Science for What?

Mark Solovey, Social Science for What? Battles over Public Funding for the ‘Other Sciences’ at the National Science Foundation (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 2020). 398 pp. $50.00 (pb). ISBN: 978-0-262-53905-0.

Lucian Bessmer, Harvard University

Social Science for What? is a remarkably detailed history of the National Science Foundation (NSF) from 1945 to the late 1980s that makes a compelling case for the influence of the Foundation on American social science. Those familiar with author Mark Solovey’s Shaky Foundations will recognize the care that he has put into presenting an account built on rich archival materials to “follow the money” in order to show the impact of what he calls the “politics-patronage-social science nexus” (10-12). Where Shaky Foundations examined how the Ford Foundation, the U.S. military, and the NSF shaped the social sciences, Social Science for What? delves deeper into the NSF in an attempt to address a gap Solovey identifies in the literature: the role of civilian agencies as patrons of social science. This in itself makes this book an important contribution to the large body of work on Cold War scientific patronage, which generally focuses on the relationships between science, the military, and intelligence agencies. But the more ambitious claim of Social Science for What? is that the NSF played a significant part in positioning the human sciences as participants in the “unified scientific enterprise” (12). Solovey argues that mimicking the methods and epistemic justification of the natural sciences may have enabled the social sciences to carve out a tiny redoubt in the NSF, but ultimately it created barriers to their health and development, disincentivizing the most beneficial aspects of these fields.

The book’s ten chapters offer a roughly chronological investigation of how stakeholders of the social sciences, both inside and outside of the NSF, sought to legitimize a collection of fields that were treated with skepticism at best and as a menace to American society at worst. Solovey crafts each chapter around a person, a set of legislative proposals or controversies, or the shifting organization and priorities of the social science division leadership at the NSF. Chapter 1 sets the stage with the first efforts to create the NSF in 1945. During the post-war period there was tremendous enthusiasm for science (and especially physical science) in the United States, creating an opportunity for prominent figures in the scientific community to advocate for additional federal support for basic physical science. Many of the most influential people spearheading this effort, such as Vannevar Bush, science advisor to President Harry Truman, doubted the relevance and rigor of the social sciences, but calculated lobbying led to the reluctant inclusion of the social sciences in the NSF, on the grounds that these fields were a nascent branch of a unified science. Chapter 2 follows Harry Alpert, the head of social science efforts at the NSF during the McCarthy era. In a time when social science was under intense scrutiny, Alpert chose a pragmatic approach to champion social science, described by his successor Henry Reicken as “underdogging” or “allying one’s cause with stronger others, in this case the physical and biological sciences” (56). Chapters 3 and 4 show how this further cemented the strategy of proponents of the social sciences at the NSF from the late 1950s to the late 1960s, with a continued effort to attract funding through the proximity to other more respected fields at the Foundation. Many scholars opposed this positivist approach, instead calling for a defense of social science through a demonstration of its unique strengths. Despite this criticism, leaders at the NSF sought to maintain legitimacy through scientism, actively working against attempts to separate from their aspirational peers such as the creation of a separate National Social Science Foundation (130). Chapter 5 shows how the combination of financial austerity and opposition from legislators in both the Democratic and Republican parties in the late 1960s and 1970s created a hostile environment for social science research at the NSF. Emblematic of this period was Senator William Proxmire’s “golden fleece,” which he awarded to the federal research that he saw as the biggest waste of taxpayer money – often NSF-supported social science research (146-155). Chapters 6 and 7 highlight the emphasis the NSF put on the “hard wing” of social science. This included “big science” work like the National Election Studies, and projects that incorporated economics methods and theories (195, 256). Chapters 7 and 8 bring us through the massive cuts to federal support of social science during the Reagan era, further driving the NSF to supporting only the “hardest” social science research.

The two final chapters directly address the through line of the book: The NSF played a major role in the post-war ascendance of a positivist case for the social sciences, one where research is objective, non-controversial, and above all, scientific enough to be a part of a unified scientific community. Those controlling the NSF’s purse strings perennially sought legitimacy through association with more respected fields, a choice that ultimately weakened, rather than strengthened, social science. Solovey closes with the recommendation that social scientists should seriously consider advocating for a separate national foundation. He acknowledges how unlikely it is for such an effort to succeed but argues that we should not make excuses “for resigned acceptance of the status quo” (316). This is a compelling argument, and this history of the social sciences at the NSF is strong evidence that the scientism approach has failed, but it is unclear who Solovey is trying to convince. He points to Congress and the NSF itself as obstacles to such a foundation, but what about rank-and-file social scientists?

Social Science for What? includes portraits of those in or closely tied to the NSF who were true believers in the unity of science, those that promoted scientism despite their private beliefs, and examples of the exclusion of left-leaning social scientists from decisions on the future of the NSF. An important part of this story is the choices made by departments that prioritized the “hard wing” of social science to legitimate themselves, and their legacy through the students that they trained, which could be addressed more explicitly in this study. Social Science for What? is an excellent book, and one that I am glad to have on my bookshelf, but it leaves open the question of where a new National Social Science Foundation would fit into existing efforts to buttress nuclear age social science. Perhaps the implications of the NSF’s impact on these fields further reinforces how patronage moulds social science, but are the biggest barriers to a better social science Congress, the NSF, and private sources of funding? I left this book wondering that if social scientists must abandon the positivist argument of their contribution, does the path forward involve convincing the people with the purse strings or should we rather convince our colleagues?

Review: The Sense of Movement

Roger Smith: The Sense of Movement. An Intellectual History (London: Process Press, 2019)

Sonsoles Hernández Barbosa, University of the Balearic Islands 

The Sense of Movement addresses bodily perceptions of movement over the last four centuries. The work begins by presenting philosophical debates about movement as a vital force which emerged in parallel with the birth of modern science in the seventeenth century, linking these with modern notions about the operation of the human brain. As the author points out, the study of movement and its conceptualisation involves setting up a dialogue between current and past understandings of the sense of movement.

Although The Sense of Movement begins with these reflections about the operation of the world of the senses connected with the scientific revolution in the seventeenth-century, some of its arguments reach back much further in time, specifically to the Aristotelian classification of the five senses. The very use of the expression ‘sense of movement’ implies a direct confrontation with the Aristotelian philosophical tenet, which held that movement could only be understood in relation to the sense of touch. Indeed, the extent to which we can refer to a sense of movement that is independent from touch is one of the main issues addressed by the book. Many of the historical difficulties raised by this issue are to do with the fact that the sense of movement and that of touch cannot be pinned down to a specific organ, insofar as the skin covers the whole body. Today, however, a conceptualisation of the senses that goes beyond the five traditional senses, including the perception of pain, temperature and even time, is widely accepted.[1]

Smith, whose areas of specialisation straddle the fields of philosophy and the history of science, argues that it was around 1800 that philosophy began to address the issue of human movement, when muscular motion was first recognised as a specific sense, distinct from touch. Charles Bell, who in an 1815 work referred to muscular sense as a sixth sense, played a pioneering role in this development. In another section of the book, however, Smith argues against the independent study of both senses – touch and movement – stating that the history of touch cannot neglect movement as a sense. In this, he follows the recent arguments of philosopher Matthew Ratcliffe, who considers movement part of the sense of touch. Thus, while in some parts of the book touch and movement are jointly considered, in others Smith makes a clear distinction between them.

In addition to the problematic distinction between the senses of touch and movement, the book deals with two additional thorny conceptual issues, ‘kinaesthesia’ and ‘proprioception’, which are not always used consistently even today. The former was introduced by the neurologist H. Charlton Bastian in the 1860s as a synonym for the ‘sense of movement’ but Smith prefers to use the term to refer to the ‘conscious awareness of one’s own movement’ (p. 193); ‘proprioception’, on the other hand, is used to allude to what the neurophysiologist Charles Scott Sherrington calls ‘the sensory nervous system, largely but not necessarily functioning without conscious awareness, central to the coordination of movement and posture’ (p. 10). Kinaesthesia, therefore, would imply conscious movement as opposed to proprioception, which involves a rearrangement of posture and movement that not always engages conciousness. As Smith points out, if we accept the existence of an embodied psyche this conceptualisation leads to an unsustainable dualism between body (unconscious) and mind (conscious) (p. 202). It is perhaps for this reason that other authors, in contrast with Smith, have preferred to understand proprioception as the perception of our muscles and internal organs.[2]

A final related aspect, which also hampers the imbrication of movement into traditional conceptualisations of the senses is the embodied conception of all sensorial impressions, which implies that all sensorial experiences mobilise more than one sense. In the same way that vision is embodied, the sense of movement does not depend solely on the muscles, but also on other mechanisms, such as retina images, the inner ear, tendons, joints, skin and other tissues, which means assuming the synesthetic character of all sensorial experiences.

Smith’s history of the sense of movement is a history of ideas. As such, the subject of study spans a number of fields, notably the history of science, the history of philosophy and the anthropology of the senses. The book is divided into fifteen independent chapters that could have been assembled into various sections in the table of contents, especially because some common threads readily come to mind, for instance that which links the postulates of natural science (Chapter 2) with thoughts on causality developed by natural philosophers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Chapter 5).

The mechanist consideration of the concept of force as movement – for instance through the principle of action-reaction – allows the author to situate this concept at the root of evolutionist ideas, thanks to the assumption among naturalists that living beings are subject to the same laws that rule over Nature . The application of this principle to the human body and the understanding of the process of evolution undergone by it emerged in the fields of naturalism and physiological studies (chapters 8 and 9). As a way of example, Herbert Spencer’s study of the phylogenetic evolution of the human body suggested the sense of touch, which includes muscular tension, as the most primitive of the senses, from which the rest of the body’s sensorial capacities derived.

Muscular effort, understood as an active force that poses resistance to events was a concept shared by scientists and idealist philosophers. The seminal nature assigned to the sense of movement in the development of the foundations of the self is a central aspect in philosophical thought that threads through the book, from Berkeley’s (Chapter 3) and Condillac’s (Chapter 4) empiricism to idealism (Chapter 7) and the phenomenology of perception (Chapter 14). Smith’s book shows that Enlightened philosophy introduced the will as a key element in the capacity for motion. Will is no longer considered dependent on the activity of the soul, but emerges from ‘la faculté de vouloir’ (p. 76), which idealism developed further as the idea of causal action (‘the Deed’) as a source of knowledge (Chapter 7). Chapter 10 specifically focuses on psychological reflections around movement.

Chapters that consider the cultural implications of movement are of special interest, for instance chapters 12 and 13, which link the perception of movement and mountaineering and contemporary dance, respectively, in connection with the idea of the individual as an active agent (Chapter 11). This amounts to a dialogue with the cultural history of the history of the senses, although Smith explicitly states that his intention is not to take a cultural history approach to the history of movement.

Overall, The Sense of Movement is a key contribution not only to understand the sense of movement but also as a general reflection on the senses more broadly. From the perspective of the history of ideas, it is a fundamental text to understand the epistemological potential of movement, which tracks a theoretical tradition that acted as a counterweight to ocularcentrism and the consideration of vision as the objective and epistemological sense par excellence.

[1] Phillip Vannini; Waskul, Dennis; Gottschalk, Simon: The Senses in Self, Society and Culture. A Sociology of the Senses [2012]. New York: Routledge, 2014, p. 6.

[2] Vannini; Waskul; Gottschalk, p. 6.

Review: Closing the Asylum

Peter Barham, Closing the Asylum: The Mental Patient in Modern Society (London: Process Press, 2020)

Steffan Blayney, University of Sheffield

When the first edition of Peter Barham’s Closing the Asylum was published in 1992, it attempted to describe the historical underpinnings of a protracted upheaval in mental health provision which was still very much ongoing. While the dismantling of the Victorian asylum system had been the professed aim of successive British governments dating back at least to the 1959 Mental Health Act – and while the overall asylum population had been declining steadily since its peak in 1954 – still in the early 1990s deinstitutionalisation remained an unfinished project. By the time of the book’s second edition in 1997, with the majority of hospitals open a decade previously now closed, this seemed harder to argue, yet by this point characterisations of ‘care in the community’ as a failure were already becoming mainstream. This new edition, published in 2020, arrives in the wake of the 2018 Independent Review of the Mental Health Act amidst ongoing debates about the extent of coercion and legal compulsion within the mental health system.

Barham’s original text, reissued here with a new prologue and preface, situated twentieth-century debates over deinstitutionalisation within the longer history of how modern societies have dealt with the ‘problem of insanity’. This has always been a social question at least as much as it has been a medical one. In nineteenth-century Britain, and particularly after the New Poor Law of 1834, the public asylum emerged – alongside the workhouse and the prison – as a means to deal with surplus populations produced by industrialisation. Idealistically imagined by their founders as spaces of care and rehabilitation, the Victorian asylums quickly became little more than overcrowded repositories for incurables and undesirables. The segregation of the mad was given legitimacy by an emerging psychiatric profession whose own optimism about the possibility of cure quickly ceded to essentialising views of mental patients as inherently ‘broken’ or ‘flawed’ individuals, who for the most part would remain incapable of participating in society and undeserving of recognition as fully human. While such conceptualisations were never without their critics, Barham argued, the eventual movement towards asylum closure that emerged in the twentieth century failed to seriously challenge the underlying ideological structures which continued to produce madness as a social problem and the mental patient as a second-class citizen.

The resulting story of deinstitutionalisation was one in which the hopes held by many for the full liberation of hospital inmates would always be secondary to more cynical policy motives. Focusing primarily on mental health law and policy in England and Wales, and weaving historical and sociological analysis with the views of service users and campaigners, Closing the Asylum described how hopes entertained by reformers from the mid-twentieth century for progressive alternatives to the authoritarian psychiatric hospital were repeatedly frustrated or co-opted. Too often, talk of patient freedoms or more enlightened approaches to care functioned as little more than ideological cover for governments eager to cut expenditure by avoiding the costs associated with long-term custodial care. Hospitals emptied, but the services which would allow former inmates to live meaningfully independent lives fail to materialise, with new developments in psychopharmacology enabling the management of symptoms without the need for costly social or psychological therapies. For some who would formerly have been hospitalised, the institutions of the criminal justice system expanded to fill the vacuum (a growing prison population since the 1990s includes an increasing proportion of inmates identified as suffering from a mental health condition). For many more, especially those already from deprived backgrounds, newfound freedoms were undermined by persistent poverty, insufficient welfare support, and the stigma of illness leading to discrimination in housing and employment. Where the mental patient is still viewed by society as a problem to be solved rather than a full political subject, Barham demonstrated, ‘community care’ can function just as effectively as the asylum as a technology of social exclusion and marginalisation.

Another aspect of the old regime which failed to disappear along with its physical architecture was its use of force and legal compulsion. While it might have been expected that the move away from the rigid hierarchy of the asylum would lead to greater liberty for patients, evidence from the last three decades, which Barham details in the prologue to the new edition, shows that the opposite is true. The use of constraint and coercion, justified by the supposed risk posed by patients to themselves or others, has not only persisted through deinstitutionalisation but is increasing. Despite falling numbers of long-stay patients, the total number of people being detained involuntarily almost tripled between 1988 and 2015. This combined with drastic reductions in the overall number of psychiatric beds through years of austerity means that half of all psychiatric inpatients are now detained under the Mental Health Act  – compared to around 10% in the 1970s. Moreover, with the arrival of Community Treatment Orders (CTOs) in 2008, mandating compulsory outpatient treatment under threat of detention, formal coercion is now no longer limited to the hospital setting. The violence of the system, it might be added, is not evenly applied: black patients are more than four times more likely to be involuntarily detained than their white counterparts, and more than ten times more likely to be subject to a CTO. Nor is the ‘shadow of coercion’ (8) which extends over the mental health system limited to those against whom the provisions of the Mental Health Act are directly mobilised. As service user activists (and some psychiatrists) have argued, in a system where patients and doctors know that the threat of compulsion is always available, it becomes difficult to see any treatment as fully voluntary.

While sharply critical of the way deinstitutionalisation has played out in practice, Barham has remained neither nostalgic for the asylum nor pessimistic about the prospects for more progressive services in the future. As he makes clear in the prologue to the new edition, ‘though the book is consistently critical and questioning of the way in which policies of community care have been implemented, it nonetheless holds steadfast to a positive view of the capabilities of the diverse range of people who are assembled under the banner of the “mentally ill”, and to the promise of community-led, above asylum-led lives for enhancing their life prospects.’ Deinstitutionalisation in this context should be seen not as an irrecoverable failure but as an unfinished ‘emancipatory project’ (28).

The ‘real questions’ that societies need to answer, as Barham maintained in 1992, have never been ‘about dismantling the mental hospitals as such, but about the prospects for manufacturing the social and political will adequate to the task of bringing back and reassimilating into society what had been thrust into the mental hospital’ (151). For Barham this means reaching a point where individuals are treated not primarily as ‘patients’, defined in law by their diagnosis, but as ‘persons’ entitled to full rights as citizens. Drawing on ideas advanced by the psychiatric survivor movement (the new edition includes a preface from the veteran campaigner Peter Campbell) he advocates a shift from managerial or paternalistic conceptions of care, underpinned by coercion, towards a focus on empowerment and autonomy for service users. This will not be achieved through legal or medical fixes, but only by reckoning with the centuries-old legacies of a system which has created the ‘mentally ill’ as a class apart.

Review: On the Heels of Ignorance

Owen Whooley, On the Heels of Ignorance: Psychiatry and the Politics of Not Knowing (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2019), ISBN: 9780226616384


Ahlam Rahal, McGill University, Montreal

Positioning himself in psychiatric knowledge as a researcher, Owen Whooley starts On the Heels of Ignorance by describing memories from his childhood, which planted the seeds that grew into his writing about psychiatric ignorance. As the son of a man with a mental illness, young Whooley had daily experienced questions related to his father’s mental health problems. His attempts to understand his father’s depression and drug addiction had always been surrounded by ignorance, uncertainty, and inscrutability. As the author explains, both he and mental health professionals failed to grasp his father’s inner world or to define clearly the characteristics of his mental illness. This experience impacted Whooley’s thoughts and provided the impetus to study historical ignorance within psychiatric knowledge. 

Unlike earlier scholars, who critically investigated the profession of psychiatry and the sociopolitical interests that underlie health professions (e.g., Foucault, 1976; Fromm, 1955), Whooley investigates both challenges in psychiatric knowledge and power interests that proliferate within the psychiatric field. The biggest challenge, according to Whooley, is ignorance, which hampers our grasp of mental illness. 

Ignorance, Whooley argues, is related to two self-reinforcing dimensions: ontology and epistemology. The ontological dimension refers to descriptions, causes, and the nature of “insanity”; whereas epistemology involves the assumptions, investigations, and inquiry approaches that grasp the essence of the mental illness. Whooley argues that the multiple definitions of the nature of the mental illness that psychiatry has offered throughout history have influenced the investigation of mental illness, and therefore, created incoherent psychiatric knowledge. Explaining these attempts to redefine and reinvent psychiatric identity, Whooley suggests that psychiatry has aimed to maintain its prestigious position, professional authority, and social control over the population and other health fields through the recreation of its discourse. Through writing this book, the author attempts to answer the following question: How has psychiatry dealt with its knowledge’s challenges, securing itself as a prestigious profession, and restoring professional power? 

To answer these questions, Whooley traces the historical development of psychiatric discourses. The author uses qualitative methods of inquiry, collects data from multiple sources, including the American Journal of Psychiatry over its entire run, professional journal articles such as the American Journal of Psychoanalysis, institutional documents, and interviews with thirty mental health professionals. Through this data, Whooley reconstructs the knowledge of psychiatry, illuminating both crises that have emerged within its body of knowledge and the strategies psychiatry has used to deal with unknown fields (i.e., ignorance). 

The book is divided into five chapters. In each chapter, the author discusses the reinvention of psychiatric knowledge in a specific period, ontological assumptions regarding mental illness, dominant therapeutic modes, and psychiatric institutional infrastructure. Each chapter ends with a remaining unknown field in psychiatry, which threatens psychiatric authority, and therefore motivates policymakers and practitioners to reinvent the body of psychiatric knowledge.

Considering the multiple transformations that psychiatry has undergone and the wide range of literature the book embraces, readers might get frustrated by seeing the incohesive forms of knowledge and different tactics that psychiatry has used in an attempt to overcome ignorance. After reading about psychiatric knowledge in each period, I pause for a breath, thinking of the varied tactics that policymakers, directors and regulators in psychiatry have used to restore psychiatric authority in each era. As the book details, these tactics mainly include cultural and institutional strategies. Culturally, officials have redefined the nature of the mental illness, starting with adopting religious morals in early times, continuing through embracing biological and psychoanalytical principles, and ending with borrowing knowledge from medicine and neuroscience. Institutionally, psychiatry has concealed its ignorance by attaching itself to a secured and prestigious doctrine that dominates the science of each period. In current times, psychiatry has attached itself to the fields of medicine and neuroscience. 

This book not only provides mental health professionals with rich information about the historical development of psychiatric knowledge, but also stimulates readers’ thoughts about psychiatrists’ interests in changing their professional knowledge. Readers who might have been diagnosed with mental illnesses might also benefit from reading this book to rethink the appropriateness of the treatments they receive. Do those treatments meet their needs? Do psychologists understand their clients’ inner worlds? Should clients be hesitant to trust mental health professionals? 

Whooley devotes a great deal of effort to exploring challenges and debates within psychiatry but pays less attention to external social events that played a role in reshaping psychiatric knowledge. An example of that is the economy. In the last chapter, Whooley shows that, when psychiatry has turned to diagnosis and medications, pharmacological companies have benefited from this transformation. But it remains unclear how the financial benefits of such companies have motivated changes in psychiatric knowledge, supporting its scientific power in turn. But incomplete answers in this book might provide readers with opportunities to study the political-economic forces that have reshaped psychiatric discourse. Such studies might grasp the understanding of how psychiatry has dealt with its ignorance in light of internal and external power relations.

Review: Psychedelic Prophets

Review: Paul Bisbee, Cynthia Carson, Erika Dyck, Patrick Farrell, James Sexton, and James W. Spisak (eds.), Psychedelic Prophets: The Letters of Aldous Huxley and Humphry Osmond (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Press, 2018) lxxix and 644 pp. ISBN: 978-0-7735-5506-8

Charlie Williams, Queen Mary University of London

Humphrey Osmond is best known as the man who turned Aldous Huxley on to mescaline in 1953. Following a brief correspondence, Huxley invited Osmond, a psychiatrist based in Saskatchewan, Canada to come and stay with him and his wife in Los Angeles. In another letter, he suggested that Osmond might bring some mescaline. Huxley’s mescaline trip was described in detail in The Doors of Perception (1954), a book which would introduce countless psychic wanderers to the powerful subjective experience of mescaline and the ‘labyrinth of endlessly significant complexity’ discovered in the folds of Huxley’s grey flannel trousers. Their meeting in California was also the beginning of a close friendship, now captured in this recent edited collection of their correspondence, Psychedelic Prophets.

As a preface to the collection tells us, both men were prodigious letter writers. Huxley is estimated to have written 10,000 letters in his lifetime. Osmond, was both an ardent letter writer and a meticulous archivist, keeping copies of both sides of the transaction. Thus, the volume is said to represent a complete set of their correspondence (apart from one or more missing pages from a letter written by Osmond on April 30, 1956). Consisting of over 275 letters, Psychedelic Prophets begins formally, with a letter addressed to “Dear Mr Huxley” on March 31, 1953 and ends ten years later with tones of much deeper affection – “My Dear Aldous” – one month prior to Huxley’s death on November 22, 1963. Their discussions follow the arc of a close friendship and a rich intellectual connection, taking deep dives into questions of psychopharmacology, schizophrenia, parapsychology, mysticism, cybernetics, Jungian psychology and psychoanalysis, alongside never-ending intrigue about the effects of psychedelic drugs. The letters also feature their impressions of numerous notable figures they encountered over this period, including Timothy Leary, Norbert Wiener, Abram Hoffer and Gerald Heard.  

The most famous moment contained within this correspondence involved a question raised by Osmond about what to label psychoactive pharmaceuticals such as mescaline. In a letter dated March 15, 1956 Osmond wrote that he felt the widely used term “psychotomimetic” (psychotic mimicry) did not do justice to the full range of experiences these drugs could produce. Various candidates for an alternative were put forward including “psychophrenics”, “psycholytics” and the accurate yet clunky “euleutheropsychics” (260-263). Huxley was keen on phanerothyme (soul revealing) and signed off his letter with a short rhyme: “To make this trivial world sublime, take half a gramme of phanerothyme” (266). But they eventually settled on Osmond’s suggestion “psychedelic”, combining “psyche” – the Greek for “mind” – and “delos” – meaning “to manifest” or “bring to light”. Osmond even penned his own ditty: “To fathom Hell or soar angelic, just take a pinch of PSYCHEDELIC” (267).

It was certainly an artful piece of branding. “Psychedelic” met their criterion of having a clear meaning, being easy to pronounce and being unlike any other name. It captured their idea that the consciousness altering experience of psychedelic drugs was no mental aberration but instead facilitated a widening of the doors of perception, an opening up of the self and the possibility of furthering human potential beyond the limits of everyday consciousness. It was an idea that would not only shape early approaches to psychedelic therapy, but also carry through to popular culture as LSD became a symbol of rebellion and cultural change in the 1960s. More recently, Nicholas Langlitz has shown how the idea derived from Huxley and Osmond that psychedelics remove some kind of vestigial filter on the mind or brain remains influential in psychedelic culture and research today, despite conflicting neurophysiological evidence (2012, 125-127).  

In the last two decades proponents of psychedelics have championed a so-called ‘psychedelic renaissance’ (Sessa, 2012). Strict regulations that all but put an end to legitimate research in the 1960s have been cautiously lifted and psychedelic drugs are once again being touted for their potential to treat various common and chronic mental conditions. This resurgent biomedical interest has also been accompanied by a wave of scholarship in the humanities and social sciences, much of which has shown how difficult it is to decouple contemporary psychedelic research from its turbulent history (Dyck, 2008; Richert, 2019; Evans, 2017; Langlitz, 2012; Hartogsohn, 2020).. Despite remarkable progress in the decriminalisation of psychedelics for clinical use, Ericka Dyck, an editor of Psychedelic Prophets, points out that the latest phase of psychedelic research shares much in common with its historical beginnings – ‘enthusiasm and awe, and hyperbolic claims about the drug’s potential impact on a wide range of medical concerns’ (2017).  Navigating this hyperbole, Dyck suggests, requires attention to the same fault lines and epistemological problems that psychedelic research has tripped up on in the past. In Britain today, ketamine therapy for depression is available on the NHS and advocates hope that psilocybin, MDMA and LSD will all be added to the roster of widely prescribed pharmaceutical therapies within the next five to ten years. But the popularity of microdosing, retreats and informal encounters with psychedelics also show that self-medication and experimentation are how the majority experience these drugs, suggesting that psychedelic therapy will continue to traverse the boundaries of the medical establishment even as these drugs become part of more orthodox therapeutic interventions.   

Other scholarship has focused on the question of how cultural meanings of psychedelic drugs influence how an experience plays out in a lab, clinic or recreational setting. During the first wave of psychedelic research both Osmond and Huxley were well aware that the psychedelic experience was influenced by social and environmental factors often referred to as ‘set’ and ‘setting’. Set may be understood as any factor that an individual brings to the experience, including their personality, motives, previous knowledge or experience, mood and preparation. Setting refers to both the physical and social environment in which the experience takes place. More recently, researchers have referred to set and setting under the more general umbrella term “context” (Carhart-Harris et al, 2018). If context is key to the effectiveness of psychedelics in therapy so is an understanding of the history of ideas that surround them. In his account of post war LSD research, Ido Hartogsohn argues that the principles of set and setting may be applied historically to understand the ‘psychosocial construction’ of drug effects through an examination of the complex interactions between psychopharmacological effects and broader socio-cultural factors shaping drug experience (2020; see also 2017). Hartogsohn (2017), for example, suggests that early 1950s experiments which studied psychedelics under the pretext of inducing psychosis were far more likely to foster negative experiences and instigate ‘the very responses they expected to find’. Many of the epistemological challenges encountered by psychedelic researchers, including set and setting, are dealt with in Langlitz’ Neuropsychedelia: The Revival of Hallucinogen Research Since the Decade of the Brain (2012). Langlitz suggests that the age of psychedelic research offers a unique opportunity for empirical research scientists to apply the kinds of approaches associated with the medical humanities and science studies scholarship.  

Much of the history of psychedelics, particularly those that incorporate a more diverse understanding of the actors, places and cultures that have lent psychedelics their meaning is still to be written. But between 1956 and 1963 Osmond and Huxley found themselves in a unique position, with access to many newly synthesised or recently “discovered” psychoactive substances and amongst a network of influential intellectuals interested in how these drugs could reshape not only therapy but society more broadly. Their history as well as that of psychedelic research is mapped out in the comprehensive introduction and epilogue to Psychedelic Prophets. But for historians, scientists or anyone else interested in delving deeper into the foundational ideas that have driven psychedelic culture, this huge volume of Huxley and Osmond’s correspondence contains rich pickings.  

Review: A Philosopher’s Economist: Hume & the Rise of Capitalism

Margaret Schabas and Carl Wennerlind, A Philosopher’s Economist: Hume & the Rise of Capitalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2020), 316pp. $45.00. ISBN: 9780226597447

by Tyson Leuchter, King’s College London

Margaret Schabas and Carl Wennerlind announce their intentions in the title: David Hume, a “philosopher’s economist” and not “an economist’s philosopher.” Hume has long enjoyed a towering reputation in fields ranging from ethics to political theory to metaphysics to epistemology. While his economic thought, particularly on monetary matters, has been studied, until now there has been no full-length, English-language work on his economic doctrines as a whole (16).[1] Schabas and Wennerlind, both leading scholars in the history of economic thought, seek to redress this oversight in A Philosopher’s Economist: Hume & the Rise of Capitalism. Their aim is to “restore the sense in which Hume’s life and writings form an integral whole centered on economics, broadly construed, as a unifying thread” (6). Rather than a philosophical giant with brilliant, but piecemeal insights into economics, for Schabas and Wennerlind Hume is equally a thoroughgoing economist, whose doctrines were developed in tandem with his philosophical dispositions. In this interpretation, Hume’s thought on the specie-flow mechanism – the means by which international specie circulation might, in the long run, smooth out trade imbalances – must therefore be thought together with his empiricist epistemology. The result is an effective reconstruction of Hume’s cosmopolitan economic vision.

The authors’ task is in some ways archaeological. The bulk of Hume’s economic thought resides in his Political Discourses (1752), later collected in Essays Moral, Political, and Literary (1741-77). But, Schabas and Wennerlind suggest, focusing solely on these works gives an incomplete picture of the expansiveness of Hume’s economic thought, as well as its connection to the rest of his philosophical oeuvre. Hume’s works must be mined deeply and assembled into a coherent form for his economic doctrine to fully come to light. Schabas and Wennerlind thus examine the Political Discourses, but also find significant economic theory in more unexpected places, such as Hume’s youthful (and, much to his disappointment, far from sensationally received) tome on epistemology, metaphysics, and moral philosophy A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40), as well as in its later reworkings as An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748) and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751). Hume’s bestselling The History of England (1754-62), they find, contains significant material on economic topics, as does his posthumously published Dialogues concerning Natural Religion (1779). What emerges, Schabas and Wennerlind argue, is a particular kind of economic thought, attentive both to the quantitative implications of economic growth, but also to the moral dimensions of global economic transformations. Hume, in this view, uncannily anticipated recent developments in economics, such as the behavioral turn and the dramatic increase in attention to distributional issues and inequality, inspired by figures such as John Rawls and Thomas Piketty; such “ethical and behavioral foundations” to economics, the authors claim, were strikingly absent for much of the twentieth century (5). Hume thus becomes a sort of epistemological econometrician with interests in both prices and psychology, an economist whose normative orientation is not simply towards efficiency or individual preference maximization, but also towards the virtues of “nonpecuniary goods,” such as happiness, justice, and friendship.

Schabas and Wennerlind pursue this argument across seven tightly argued chapters. They first place Hume’s long-standing pursuit of economic knowledge in biographical context. The authors detail Hume’s birth in 1711 (as “David Home,” changed to “Hume” in 1734) to modest circumstances in Scotland, his brief clerkship to a Bristol sugar importer (a position from which he was dismissed for correcting his employer’s grammar – surely a sobering warning to aspiring pedants everywhere), his time living abroad in continental Europe, where he observed the cultural and demographic effects of differing levels of economic development (25-39). This chapter also reveals Schabas and Wennerlind’s main approach to contextualization: they take great care to reconstruct Hume’s intellectual network, combing through his correspondence to trace the paths of influence and intellectual development. Throughout the book, the authors note his interactions with a diverse range of figures, such as the Dutch financier Isaac de Pinto, Scottish “stadial theorists” Adam Ferguson and Lord Kames, famed natural historian Comte de Buffon, as well as with other leading Enlightenment figures including Adam Smith, Diderot, and Rousseau (from whom he later became estranged, a not unusual occurrence given Rousseau’s temperament) (27-28). These reconstructed intellectual networks are connected with significant events in Hume’s life – the authors note, for instance, that his time in Bristol would have exposed him to complex economic transactions, surely influencing his later thoughts on economic flows and monetary issues. Indeed, with Bristol’s leading place in the sugar industry, Hume would have had firsthand experience of one of Britain’s most dynamic economic sectors, but also a sector that was fundamentally connected with Caribbean slavery and the Atlantic slave trade (32).

Chapter two details Hume’s approach to economic methodology. Hume’s principal concern, Schabas and Wennerlind argue, was to create a true “science” of economics. His approach was thus nomothetic, with the variety of human experience brought into lawlike order and unity (51-52). The authors draw nuanced connections to Hume’s epistemological skepticism regarding the limits of human knowledge. Hume’s critique of these limits regarding the physical world has become famous enough to be called the ‘Hume Induction Problem’. In brief, given the epistemic apparatus of our senses, we are essentially locked out from knowing the “inner causes” of most phenomena covered by the physical sciences. Thus, while we may have seen one event constantly follow another – billiard balls striking each other, in Hume’s famous example – and thus may strongly expect (or mentally associate) that they will act similarly in the future, this sort of induction from experience does not, in the end, produce sure knowledge of the necessary logical connection between cause and effect. However, Schabas and Wennerlind observe, for Hume this is not the case with economic behavior. As they write,

Whereas in the physical sciences, we must ‘confine our speculations to the appearances of objects,’ as Hume had said, with human actions we can also venture into the internal causes, presumably via the same process of introspection that Hume used to establish the mental laws of association. The moral sciences have this advantage of permitting us to grasp a layer of causation that is blocked for the most part in the natural sciences (62).

Because economic behaviour is the interaction of human agents, in principle we can probe the nexus of causal factors: willed action, moral dispositions, habit, customs, and so on. On an epistemological level, then, for Hume economic science was actually more secure than the physical sciences.

Schabas and Wennerlind next tackle Hume’s account of the institutions of property and commerce. Hume placed property rights at the center of his theory of justice, they argue, so that the rule of law could securely channel individual economic interests into virtuous circuits of exchange. Hume, they write, put much stock in the potential of commerce to engender more refinement, prudence, and liberty. He also believed that the concomitant urbanization would induce more civility, friendship, and humanity. Above all, the modern economy would foster a wide array of social virtues, notably honesty, politeness, and beneficence. All of this depended critically on upholding the system of property rights and hence the rule of law. It was these beneficial outcomes, the effects of the law, that gave it warrant, not a more primitive appeal to fairness or equality (96).

The putative utilitarian logic of mutually beneficial commercial exchange, in this view, would polish manners, pacify hostilities, and lead to aggregate increases in happiness. To do so effectively, the authors note, required two further institutions: markets and money. Schabas and Wennerlind’s focus is mostly on the latter – fittingly, given Hume’s attention to monetary issues. They suggest that money, for Hume, was “intrinsically semiotic” (99). Rather than constituting an inherent store of value, money was a kind of language, in which different commodities could be “translated” into each other through market exchange. Monetary transactions thus represented a kind of pledge, a promise that two commodities were, in the minds of the transacting parties, of commensurable value. Insofar as monetary transactions depended on the fulfillment of a promise, Schabas and Wennerlind note, Hume thus saw money and credit as residing on the same continuum (100-103). Hence the importance of maintaining faith in the security of the money supply and, as the authors examine in later chapters, of avoiding the seductive pitfalls of public credit.

 What moral qualities might characterize this improving world? Schabas and Wennerlind suggest that, for Hume, the material particularities of commerce produced a host of moral benefits: greater urbanization, greater equality between the sexes, the softening of hostile impulses, the promotion of cross-cultural trade, the development of new tastes, the fostering of a spirit of “industry” (115-119, 127). Schabas and Wennerlind compellingly argue that industry was particularly important for Hume not only for the commodities and wealth it might produce, but also for the virtuous habits and dispositions it might inculcate: “Hume insisted that by working diligently in one’s profession, one could not only find happiness but also inadvertently cultivate various virtues and thus contribute to the refinement of society. Because work occupies the majority of one’s waking hours, it offers the means to discipline and dignify one’s life” (121). The authors further connect this dispositional advantage of industry to Hume’s sociology: the “middle ranks” of society were those most able to sustainably produce the spirit of industry, while also integrating the honest virtues of the lower classes and the generous sociability of those above (136).

Schabas and Wennerlind return to monetary matters in chapter five. This is where the authors examine Hume’s antimercantilist arguments about the specie-flow mechanism, in which individual consumption patterns in the aggregate necessarily frustrated any top-down political attempts to dominate the global marketplace (143-146). Schabas and Wennerlind also lay out the “non-neutrality” of Hume’s quantity theory of money: money might be a kind of language, for Hume, but it was a language that could create real effects in the system of production. The authors build this argument by exploring one of Hume’s characteristic thought experiments: a galleon, laden with specie, arrives from Cadíz and unloads in a local port. What happens to the local economy? Both authors agree that, for Hume, this influx of money stimulates economic growth. But at this sole point in the book, the authorial voices splits in two. Wennerlind favours a broadly demand-side explanation: the influx of foreign specie is a result of increased demand for exports, raising both domestic wages and output, which increased wealth, in turn, filters into other sectors of the local economy through market exchange. Schabas, on the other hand, expounds an initially supply-side account, focusing particularly on the money supply. The influx of foreign specie replaces the poor-quality money in which wages were normally paid – in a kind of inverse of Gresham’s Law, good money here drives out bad. With workers now paid in high-quality specie, they happily work more intensively, allowing manufacturers to respond dynamically to increased foreign demand for output, with spillover effects on other domestic sectors as workers also increase domestic spending. Whichever explanation is favored, the authorial voice reconverges in suggesting that Hume had thus foreseen the economic concept of the multiplier (153-158).

Hume was deeply concerned about the distributional and political implications of international trade and public finance. The authors here find him at, simultaneously, his most and least cosmopolitan. Schabas and Wennerlind dissect Hume’s critique of the “jealousy of trade” plaguing eighteenth-century capitalism. In a world crisscrossed by imperial rivalries, Hume noted a distressing tendency to towards zero-sum thinking, with one nation’s economic ascendancy thought to entail another’s decline. This, in turn, dictated protectionist policies, destructive imperial competition, and devastating wars. Hume pleaded for nations to abandon the malevolent passion of jealousy and instead, through free trade, channel “envy and emulation” to more globally salutary ends (177-180). Free trade would not eliminate interstate competition but domesticate it, with nations spurring each other to ever-greater heights of improvement and wealth. For Schabas and Wennerlind, Hume here becomes an early theorist of globalization: given the variety of initial conditions, free trade policies would set countries along differing developmental paths, with rich countries specializing in high-quality manufactures and poor countries specializing in agriculture and rougher commodity production. But, given the mobility of labour and capital, in the long run the benign effects of emulation and trade would spread improvement across the globe (182-186). Free international trade would thus accomplish the economic ends of empire, but, supposedly, without the need for violence or conquest. Hume’s cosmopolitanism did, however, slam into racial barriers. As the authors note, though he opposed slavery and the slave trade, his dismissive opinions regarding the developmental capacities of non-white peoples, particularly Africans, were nothing short of appalling (191-194). This chapter also sees the authors explicating Hume’s pessimistic account of public debt. Since debt funded imperial warfare, led to burdensome taxation, perverted the political order, and so offered an irresistible tool for irresponsible policymakers, to Hume it represented an existential threat to states (195-202). Thus, as he put it, “either the nation must destroy public credit, or public credit will destroy the nation” (195-202). Hume preferred the former.

The seventh and final chapter discusses Hume’s lasting influence on economic thought. Schabas and Wennerlind make a convincing argument for Hume’s enduring influence on his friend and younger contemporary Adam Smith (211-221), as well as on later economic theory of both libertarian and liberal convictions (230-237). Other connections are drawn a bit more thinly. The authors, for instance, claim that the Encyclopédie’s famous plates, which promoted the dignity and importance of the mechanical arts, “reflects Hume’s own emphasis on the economic importance of manufacturing and practical knowledge” (222). But while Hume was undoubtedly influential, the Encyclopédie plates drew from a vast array of intellectual wellsprings.[2]

The book ends on a decidedly ambivalent note. Until the end of his life, Hume remained optimistic about the potential of actions enmeshed in the web of commerce and capitalism to improve the world. But were he to land in current times, the authors ask, would he hold the same opinions (240)? They leave it a provocatively open question.

A Philosopher’s Economist marks an important scholarly intervention. The authors make a compelling case for the importance, if not the centrality, of economics to Hume’s work. They skillfully reconstruct Hume’s multiple and interlocking economic doctrines, a difficult task given both the complexity of Hume’s thought and the comparatively short length of the volume. Particularly impressive is the way that they connect these doctrines to Hume’s epistemological and metaphysical stances, connections which otherwise might have been overlooked. Their contextualization of Hume’s social and intellectual networks, and how they shaped his work, is also well executed. In their overall construction, Hume articulates a broadly optimistic vision of how commerce might lead to an improved world, but it was still a world vulnerable to human vanity, weakness, and jealousy.

This is a compact volume, Hume’s thought is expansive, and the authors have written elsewhere on the topic.[3] That said, for a standalone work, there are two areas that might have been profitably addressed. Firstly, the question of how Hume’s personal stances on slavery and empire may, or may not, have intersected with his economic thought. As mentioned, Hume, despite his contempt for the mental capabilities of nonwhite peoples, was an opponent of slavery. However, he also seems to have lent money to a friend involved in the slave system, as well as maintained friendships with those connected to Atlantic slavery (192). Schabas and Wennerlind do not obscure any of this. But they also do not press these connections much beyond the charge of hypocrisy. For all his disapproval of slavery, Hume was nonetheless willing to carve out a degree of space for the circulation of slave-produced commodities. As the authors note, Hume at one point suggested that, however temporarily, tariffs might be designed to steer domestic demand away from foreign brandy and towards British rum (180) – a distilled molasses product, the sugarcane for which would have been produced within the hellish world of the Caribbean slave complex. Similarly, they rightly note that Hume was firmly opposed to military conquest and empire by the sword (177-178). But that does not necessarily imply being opposed to empire tout court. Indeed, Hume served (as a noncombatant) in the abortive invasion of Lorient in 1746, and later as undersecretary of state during an age of imperial expansion (xiv, 177). And as Hume’s friend and correspondent Diderot, in his contributions to the Abbé Raynal’s massively influential Histoire des Deux Indes, argued, colonies were theoretically permissible under certain circumstances.[4] The degree to which Enlightenment thought was or was not sympathetic to empire, colonization, and enslavement continues to be a live topic.[5]

Second is Hume’s position on finance. Schabas and Wennerlind observe that, in 1761, Hume invested about one thousand pounds in securities, likely publicly traded “bonds or shares in a mercantile company” (41). Hume was, apparently, adamant that his financial holdings were ‘real’, as opposed to the speculations of stockjobbers. How might this notion of ‘real’ financial wealth intersect with Hume’s overall starkly negative account of public debt, along with his theoretical concerns over money and credit? Given that capital mobility and the liquidity of money were central to his accounts of the specie-flow mechanism, global development, and economic multiplier effects, it would be valuable to know more not just about what Hume thought of the concept of finance, but also about the mechanics of financial markets.

Such explorations would perhaps have added further to what is already a strong and important intellectual contribution. A Philosopher’s Economist is an insightful, well-argued, and compelling volume, written and researched with great skill by two expert scholars. It will be of great interest to readers in the history of economic thought, the history of capitalism, and Enlightenment studies.

Tyson Leuchter (@inkybrained) is a lecturer in Global History at King’s College London. He is currently composing a book manuscript on financial capitalism, the Paris Stock Exchange, and the transformations of the French empire in the early nineteenth century.

[1] In English, the closest work the authors note is Eugene Rotwein’s editor’s introduction to a collection of Hume’s economic writings, originally written in 1955, then revised and reissued in 1970 and 2007; other book-length studies have addressed Hume’s economics, though Schabas and Wennerlind argue that these works do not take as systematic an approach as their own.

[2] John R. Pannabecker, “Representing Mechanical Arts in Diderot’s ‘Encyclopédie’,” Technology and Culture, 39 (1998), 33-73.

[3] Both authors have written several articles specifically on Hume, in addition to hosting a workshop on his economics (241), and co-editing David Hume’s Political Economy (Routledge: Abingdon, 2008).

[4] As Diderot wrote, “Both reason and equity permit the establishment of colonies, but they also mark out the principles from which one must not stray when founding them.” See Denis Diderot, “Extracts from the Histoire des Deux Indes,” in John Hope Mason and Robert Wokler, eds, Diderot: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge Unversity Press, 1992), 175.

[5] The classical statement of the issue is Michèle Duchet, Anthropologie et Histoire au Siècle des Lumières (Paris: Albin Michel, 1971). See also Sankar Muthu, Enlightenment Against Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); William Max Nelson, “Making Men: Enlightenment Ideas of Racial Engineering,” American Historical Review, 115 (2010), 1364-94; Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Anthony Pagden, Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c. 1500-c. 1800 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

Interview: Erik Baker on entrepreneurs, libertarians, ‘philanthrocapitalists’ and the Santa Fe Institute

Erik Baker (Harvard University) received a commendation in this year’s History of the Human Sciences Early Career Essay Prize. We spoke to him about his research and his commended essay ‘The Ultimate Think Tank: The Rise of the Santa Fe Institute Libertarian’.

HHS: First of all, congratulations on your commendation in the History of the Human Sciences Early Career Essay Prize, for your essay ‘The Ultimate Think Tank’. To begin with, could you briefly introduce your dissertation on ‘The Entrepreneurial Work Ethic: Creativity, Leadership, and the Sciences of Labor Discipline in the United States’ and explain how this article fits into that project?

Erik Baker: Thanks and thanks again to the editors of HHS for the commendation – it’s a real honour and thank you for taking the time to share this work.

My broader dissertation project is about the history of what I call ‘entrepreneurial management.’ That strikes some people as a contradiction in terms. Typically we think of management and managers as faceless, gray-suited technocrat types, and we tend to think of entrepreneurs as really dynamic with innovative startups etc. But the cultural figures who typify the entrepreneur category are themselves also bosses. If you think of Elon Musk or Jeff Bezos, these are people who are icons of entrepreneurship, but they’re also executives who command increasingly large armies of employees. What I show is that since the early 20th century, management theorists have been interested in capturing this mystique that surrounds the entrepreneur, which seems to allow entrepreneurs to command attention, loyalty and legitimacy in a way that other kinds of managers don’t. And they’ve sought to propagate that entrepreneurial spirit among the managerial ranks more broadly.

The result, in the United States economy, is what I call ‘the entrepreneurial work ethic’. This comes from the claim that what makes entrepreneurs effective bosses is the fact that they themselves are committed to a creative project that energizes the firm and willing to work extraordinary hours in pursuit of this vision. They’re able to inculcate commitment to the firm’s mission among their employees through the example of their own work ethic, so people authentically buy into what the firm’s about. They seek to emulate the work ethic of the entrepreneurial leader of the firm.

The material in this article helps to fill in this story. This article is about the Santa Fe Institute, which has been an important proponent, particularly since the 1990s, of entrepreneurial management in the American economy. They had an illustrious list of clients, in what they call their business network, who came to them for advice about how they ought to manage their firms in the construction of what was called at the time ‘the New Economy’. I’m interested in the way that this research institute used a particular metaphor from the natural sciences, the complex adaptive system, to legitimate these changes that were occurring on a much broader scale in the American economy at this time – outsourcing, downsizing, the elimination of middle management ranks etc. All of this was again in service of this vision of a firm that is really managed by inspiring employee initiative, rather than by directing employees in a bureaucratic manner. This was possible because the firms themselves would be saturated with a creative purpose that was supplied by their entrepreneurial leaders.

The other component of this article is this concept of social entrepreneurship, which became a key concept at SFI in the last 20 years. This is the extrapolation of the vision of the entrepreneurial business leader to the social realm. It involves a conception of social problem solving that’s driven by the creative, diligent work of particular entrepreneurial leaders, whether that’s an NGO, working in private businesses, or particular kinds of charismatic political figures. This is related to a broader migration of this concept of entrepreneurship out of the for-profit business world into a much wider range of professional settings, to the point where the Santa Fe Institute researchers themselves are often encouraged to self-identify as scientific entrepreneurs. This, of course, also entails an entrepreneurial work ethic and the expectation of a uniquely driven and committed devotion to a particular creative project.

HHS: I was wondering if you would argue that an ‘entrepreneurial work ethic’ is demanded by academic work and institutions today? 

EB: Totally. A large part of the motivation for this project in the first place was identifying this compulsion to extraordinary and increasing work hours that characterize not just my experience in academia, but the experience of people working in all sorts of professional settings. This is, of course, encouraged top down from university leadership. The rhetoric of entrepreneurship, particularly in United States universities, is totally ubiquitous – there are campus centres for encouraging entrepreneurship and entrepreneurship prizes etc. This is the way that academics, alongside all kinds of other professional and managerial workers, are supposed to be conceptualizing themselves. One of the reasons that I was attracted to this project was precisely because there are intellectual figures, scientists and social scientists, who are advocating for entrepreneurship while they’re also conceptualizing themselves as scientific entrepreneurs. You can see the porosity of the boundaries between these domains and the way that this culture of entrepreneurialism has come to saturate both these fields.

HHS: Why did you choose to focus on the Santa Fe Institute?

EB: There was a lot of serendipity involved, ultimately. When I was starting my research and tracking down examples of this way of thinking, I was struck by this quite surprising elective affinity between economic and managerial concepts of entrepreneurship and innovation, on the one hand, and the scientific concept of complex adaptive systems, on the other. That led me to the Santa Fe Institute, which is still the biggest name in this field. But also, I was struck by the extent to which this place seem to be a kind of gravitational attractor for these people and that got me really interested in thinking about SFI, not just as a machine for cranking out ideas, but as a social location or social space where people came, learned something and acquired elements of a new worldview and then left and did other things.

HHS: You claim that the SFI’s main accomplishment was not the invention of ideas or an ideology, but of a particular subject (the SFI libertarian) – what distinguishes/defines this political subject? What is their ‘conceptual worldview’?

EB: This comes from a blog post from a libertarian blogger in the mid-2000s reflecting on the emergence of this new type of person or, as they say on Twitter, a ‘new type of guy’, who this writer calls the SFI libertarian. This is a person who consistently votes for Democrats, who thinks of themselves generally as a liberal person, but who substantively shares elements of the libertarian worldview, namely an emphasis on free markets and an emphasis on this concept of entrepreneurship. This is the most important synthesis that occurs at SFI. Their entrepreneurship becomes the site of their social problem-solving impulses. They’re liberals who recognize real problems in the world, and they want to solve them, but the way that they think that think they ought to be solved is through energetic entrepreneurial people like themselves starting initiatives and, in some cases, for-profit businesses.

HHS: When did these kinds of ‘independent-sector’ institutions emerge and what distinguishes them from the kinds of institutions the preceded them?

EB: In the article I situate the emergence of SFI in the collapse of the Cold War science funding regime, which saw the creation of the national laboratory system and an enormous expansion of government funding for science in universities. By the 1980s, as the Cold War was winding down, simultaneously with the emergence of a new regime of austerity in American domestic politics under Ronald Reagan, this science funding regime came into jeopardy. National Science Foundation budgets were slashed and universities were encouraged to commodify their scientific research in order to bootstrap their own science funding operations. A lot of that led to an increasing movement of scientists out of universities and national laboratories into these new, smaller ventures that were dependent not on the government, but on private philanthropy either from formal charities or from wealthy individuals.

The Santa Fe Institute is emblematic of this trend. It was founded by alums of Los Alamos National Laboratory and subsequent decades it has attracted a great number of expatriates from the world of university science. This exodus from the established world of government labs and universities is reconceptualized as a form of entrepreneurship: the scientists are striking out for themselves and they have their own new creative ventures that they’re really committed to and they’re going to work hard to get them off the ground.

HHS: What is the significance of funders in the story of SFI that you tell? And relatedly, what is ‘philanthrocapitalism’ and when does it emerge?

EB: Philanthropists come on the scene at SFI shortly after it’s founded, because they need money. There’s this optimistic idea that once the founders bring all these brilliant people together, they can leverage their connections and their prestige and everyone will be really excited about what’s going on, and that the money will take care of itself. But, of course, that doesn’t happen. They find themselves in financial dire straits pretty quickly and start to think about how to attract big funders. Eventually they establish a few really important relationships with particular corporate and philanthropic funders, and this leads to a change in the way that they conceptualize what this new institute is all about. It wouldn’t just be a place where you could bring together all the brilliant people and have them talk to each other –– they wanted something more focused and concrete. This led to an increasingly narrow identification with the subject matter of complexity or complex adaptive systems, and an increasingly explicit orientation towards the worlds of management, economics and political libertarianism. It’s a feedback loop. They see for themselves the role of wealthy corporations, foundations and individuals in getting their own research institute off the ground. This then becomes a template for how they imagine problems can be solved in the rest of society.

Not just at SFI but, more generally, the rising social importance of corporate and individual philanthropy and social problem-solving gets labeled as philanthrocapitalism. This portmanteau is supposed to denote a synthesis of older school philanthropy with the imperatives of efficiency and innovation associated with capitalism. This is philanthropy but not in a noblesse oblige way. This is philanthropy that’s supposed to zero in on the really important problems, to figure out the best way to solve them and to industrialize the process of philanthropy. This becomes closely associated with the concept of social entrepreneurship and it’s a feature of the orientation towards politics and social problems that becomes characteristic of the SFI in the 21st century.

HHS: What is the ‘complex adaptive systems concept’ and how did it become a central focus for the SFI? What does it mean to treat ‘complexity’ as a subject matter?

EB: This is a complex story in itself. So, complex systems are everywhere. You can see them everywhere from meteorology to evolutionary biology. They’ve been studied for a long time. What makes the system complex is, basically, that it can’t be modeled linearly. Small effects in one area of the system have surprising and difficult to predict consequences for the behavior of the system as a whole.

The concept of complex adaptive systems comes a bit later. This really begins to take off in the 1980s. The complex adaptive system is a complex system that, in addition to having all the other complex system attributes, adapts to its environment. It displays properties of self-organization and increasing fitness in response to external stimuli. The idea is that complex adaptive systems exhibit properties of order and in some settings even beauty –– but they were not designed that way. This happens spontaneously, as a result of processes of adaptation. There’s no director who sits atop the complex adaptive system and tells it how to improve, rather each agent or molecule in the complex adaptive system is responding to its own environmental challenges. And as a result of the way that the system is organized, this adaptation produces increasing fitness and order for the system as a whole.

This concept of the complex adaptive system has very strong analogies with the concept of spontaneous order, which was developed in the mid 20th century period by intellectuals associated with political libertarianism, including the economist Friedrich Hayek and the philosopher Michael Polanyi. This is a connection that it does not take long for libertarians and scientists to recognize, which helps to explain why libertarian philanthropists get very excited when they hear that some of the scientists at the Santa Fe Institute are interested in complex adaptive systems. They really encourage them to go further down this path, to draw out these analogies between complex adaptive systems in nature and this conception of markets and firms in the capitalist economy as spontaneous orders. So SFI became increasingly preoccupied with attempting to spell out the principles that unify these complex adaptive systems everywhere. And again, this is a move away from the initial vision of the institute, which was to identify people who are at the top of their fields in different disciplines and get them together to see what emerged from their collaboration.

HHS: You argue that the 1990s was ‘characterized by a strong degree of coordinated action by elite actors in business and government to enact the transformations required for the construction of the New Economy’ – would you also argue that this was a significant moment in the development of libertarianism (either generally or at SFI specifically)?

EB: Yes, certainly. This is a major theme of my work and I think a lot of the best recent work on libertarianism and neoliberalism: itrequires a lot of work and coordination to construct a system that’s supposed to regulate itself. This is a period that has been characterized as the zenith of neoliberalism. After Reagan and Thatcher even formerly centre-left parties in the US in the UK turn towards free markets, deregulation and privatization under Clinton and Blair. But the point that I want to make is that this was not just a matter of giving up on public policy or of letting it go laissez faire. This required the construction of intellectual and social networks that allowed this basic political orientation to travel throughout different spheres, different sectors, different domains. Particularly on the level of management: If you want an entrepreneurial economy, then firms and corporations require significant overhauling. You need to get businesses to become more entrepreneurial themselves and that means, in the rhetoric of this time, ‘shedding dead weight’, getting rid of bureaucracy, adopting organizational innovations to encourage employee initiative, streamlining firms to give them a laser focus on a particular sort of creative mission that is set by their entrepreneurial leadership etc. This was not a change that happened organically, it was a change that was encouraged by consultants and by the management press and the business school world.

The Santa Fe Institute was one node in the network that made these changes happen. Its contribution was to say, the economy is a complex adaptive system, the economy is composed of firms that are complex adaptive systems, and at the base layer are people who have to be trained to take this adaptive entrepreneurial approach to the world. SFI gets really interested in evolutionary psychology and claims are made that on an evolutionary level human psychology has evolved to give people certain innate dispositions towards problem solving, cooperation and adaptation.

HHS: What kinds of criticisms did SFI face in the 90s, and why or how did it overcome them?

EB: There are two challenges that emerge. One is a degree of scientific criticism from scientists, funders and science journalists. In particular there’s a scathing piece published in Scientific American in the mid-90s that takes on this new paradigm of complexity science and argues that in their search for abstract principles that unify complex adaptive systems these scientists have become untethered from empirical reality and factuality. The claim is made that no facts about the world are being discovered or accumulated at SFI, rather it’s all modeling and computer modeling in particular. The SFI research has a self-referential character, and it becomes about the coherence of this computer model, rather than any connection to procedures of verification or empirical testing. Secondly, eventually the New Economy model comes under threat, because the dot com stock market bubble bursts, and some of these firms that are supposed to be the new innovative entrepreneurial leaders, most infamously Enron, are exposed as fraudulent. There’s a lot of concern about the morality of this new high-tech venture capitalist funded economy.

At SFI this leads to a period of reorientation towards a greater interest in things like evolutionary psychology, which in their minds is a bit more grounded in the realm of the testable. The question of how humans are programmed evolutionarily or disposed by evolution to behave seems to be an empirical question in a way that questions about the grand unifying principles of complex adaptive systems are not. Then there’s also an increasing orientation towards a more socially liberal articulation of the efficiency of entrepreneurship, which leads towards the social entrepreneur and the social problem-solver. You get a series of studies that come out of SFI that tackle problems like inequality, education and global poverty. Rather than just being really enthusiastic about what’s happening on Wall Street or in Silicon Valley, there’s an idea that the principles that are emerging out of this institute can help people who are interested in making the world a better place, rather than than just in making money.

HHS: Samuel Bowles, who became director of SFI, has an interesting ideological trajectory away from Marxism – could you introduce him and describe the changes he introduced at SFI?

EB: Bowles starts his career as an important Marxist economist. Along with his collaborator Herbert Gintis, he is denied tenure for his political views and activism at Harvard in the late 1960s, early 1970s. He decamps to the University of Massachusetts in Amherst where he writes with Gintis a book called Schooling and Capitalist America that’s still on sociology syllabi and is an incredibly important work about the relationship between class and equality in education in the United States. Over time they drift away first from Marxism and then eventually from socialism. Especially important for them in making the transition is the rise of the concept of human rights and of human rights advocacy organizations like Amnesty International, which won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1977. This is happening concurrently with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Bowles and Gintis don’t abandon their commitments towards social justice along with their Marxism and their socialism, but they believe they can continue to pursue these goals by adopting this liberal politics of human rights and by looking to these organizations like Amnesty International and other NGO-type advocacy groups to engage in more entrepreneurial social problem-solving.

Bowles and Gintis come to SFI in this period of internal soul-searching at the end of the 1990s. They really help to reorient the institute towards evolutionary psychology, which they’ve become extremely interested in. Bowles oversees the rebranding of the economics program to be about behavioral science. They publish papers on people’s innate instincts towards cooperation. They imagine that a sense of fairness is evolutionarily engrained in human actors. The view becomes that it’s by encouraging this personal virtue, this cooperative behavior among individuals, that these goals that they’ve held since the 1960s can best be actualized in the 21st century. This fits into a broader story of deradicalization and a shift away from leftism, but it is important to underscore is that Bowles never loses his sense of himself as a person of who’s fighting for reform, for justice, for equality and for fairness. It’s just that his idea of how to achieve these values shifts, and there’s an intersection with this stream of thought, with roots in political libertarianism, that emphasizes entrepreneurial action and spontaneous social problem solving. For those of us who want to critique this worldview, it’s inaccurate to characterize it as a resurgence of selfishness or a retreat from other sorts of values we might think are important. The critique has to be on the question of how social problems emerge and can get solved, and particularly on the possibilities of collective action. We need to ask: what are the practical consequences of an emphasis on social-entrepreneurial problem-solving?

In the 2000s Bowles and Gintis go back to Schooling and Capitalist America. They acknowledge that inequality in educational outcomes is a real problem and that education isn’t working for a lot of people. But the answer to this is no longer this socialist political programme that’s prescribed in the original volume, it’s a much hazier and more pessimistic view about the ability of public policy to solve these problems. But it leaves the door open for

independent sector entrepreneurial solutions, namely charter schools, to address these problems instead. Again, critiquing the charter school movement by just saying that we need to care about educational outcomes or care about educational inequality is a bit of a dead end, because this is not a premise that’s denied by these people. Rather they have a different operational or instrumental perspective on how these values are best promoted.

HHS: You explain that the notion of ‘implicit bias’ arises from this context – what understanding of human nature and society does this rely on/presume?

EB: Mahzarin Banaji, the psychologist who is the co-creator of the field of implicit bias and the co-author of the most popular book on the subject, is an SFI affiliate faculty member. Samuel Bowles is in the acknowledgments of that book. The implicit bias model claims racial inequality is maintained basically by accident. There are no malicious actors. There aren’t consciously racist actors in the story that implicit bias tells. This is consistent with a view of human nature that emphasizes people’s innate desire for fairness and their innate desire to cooperate with one another. But the story is that, as a result of a hangover from a past aberrational era of forthright racism, this layer of implicit bias sort of got written over the fundamental bedrock of pro-fairness, cooperative instincts. As a result, people, in contradiction to the values they perceive themselves to hold, engage in subtle discriminatory behavior in their interactions with other people.

The solution, then, is for people to realize that they hold these implicit attitudes this and so they instinctively act in a way that’s inconsistent with the values they really hold. It holds out the promise of clearing away this residue encrusting our innate cooperative instincts. The spontaneous social dynamics that are maintaining racial inequality can just dissolve if there’s sufficient awareness of the nature of this problem, and so the way that the solution is framed is often in the form of consulting or trainings, which have now proliferated. I don’t necessarily want to say these trainings are are bad or that they shouldn’t be done. But the goal the history that I tell is to direct our attention at the kind of underlying social theory and theory of human nature that’s operating behind this movement, and to think about what’s left out of that picture.

HHS: I have a very broad question to conclude: what have been the broader social and political implications of the emergence of ‘social entrepreneurism’?

EB: It depends where you’re looking, but in the United States I think what’s most important is the way this ideology has helped to channel the broad desire for social change and social progress into support for particular entrepreneurial initiatives, alongside a tolerance for the slow erosion of other modes of social problem solving, namely the welfare state and labour unions. This is often made explicit by the more conservative or libertarian proponents of the social entrepreneurship vision, which is presented as the successor for these institutions that are seen as characteristic of a hopelessly outdated politics of the past.

On a global scale, this concept of social entrepreneurship is profoundly entwined with understandings of economic development, going back to much earlier in the 20th century. This discourse still thrives today in development circles. And we see the consequences of this worldview with the impending divorce of Bill and Melinda Gates, who are considered archetypal social entrepreneurs. The Gates Foundation is often held up as a model of social entrepreneurship or philanthrocapitalism in the realm of global health and economic development. Questions now loom about the future of this organization and the future of this one private fortune that so much of today’s global development infrastructure depends on. We’re really seeing the downsides of giving particular individuals such an outsized, non-democratic role in setting the agenda and directing the flow of resources on a global scale. And Bill Gates, too, is an extremely ardent defender of intellectual property protections and has exerted an enormous countervailing force against efforts to liberalize the intellectual policy regime around Covid vaccines. My question is, who made this guy the boss of global health? Social entrepreneurship is part of the answer.

Interview conducted by Hannah Proctor.

Interview: Liana Glew on psychiatric paperwork

Liana Glew is this year’s co-winner of the History of the Human Sciences Early Career Essay Prize. We spoke to her about her research and her winning essay ‘Documenting insanity: Paperwork and patient narratives in psychiatric history’.

HHS: First of all, congratulations on winning the History of the Human Sciences Early Career Essay Prize for your essay ‘Documenting insanity: Paperwork and patient narratives in psychiatric history’. To begin I wonder if you could briefly introduce and summarise your essay and say a little about what inspired you to write it.

Liana Glew: Thank you for the honour of the prize. The essay examines paperwork from US psychiatric hospitals in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. My purpose in this examination is to develop methods of reading that center patient agency and disability identity. The inspirations for piece were twofold. Firstly, it was inspired by a trip to the Oregon State Archives where they’ve done a really beautiful and careful job archiving this challenging history. That’s where a lot of the the material comes from. Second, it was inspired by a graduate seminar taught by Ebony Coletu, which is where I first started thinking critically about bureaucracy and paperwork.

HHS: Before I ask more about the piece itself I wonder if you could briefly talk about your PhD thesis project and how this article relates to your research more broadly?

LG: The article represents the third chapter of the dissertation, edited to stand on its own. Each chapter covers one genre of text about life inside asylums in the 19th and 20th century. So the first chapter is about fiction, the second about memoir-exposes which is a sort of hybrid genre that I’ve identified to talk about the journalistic and memoir pieces coming out around that time about life in an asylum. This third chapter covers the same paperwork material as this essay, then the fourth chapter is on archival patient writing. I’m taking writing to be a really big category, so it includes different types of artistic expression, house organs, personal journals, letters, and more.

HHS: Your essay discusses medical paperwork –what is distinctive about this kind of medical text? Does it make sense to talk about paperwork in terms of genre?

I think it does, yes. I think we’re used to looking through paperwork to get to the content of it and we don’t see the form itself. And so, by framing paperwork as a type of narrative just like other types of narratives, by placing it alongside these other genres, I think we are able to see some of the mechanisms of power at work inside these bureaucracies in a way that would be almost invisible if we weren’t taking the time to stop and look at the writing of paperwork as a genre of writing.

HHS: To rephrase a question you ask in your introduction, how did you go about reading these kinds of documents ‘while centering patients’ agency’? In what ways does paperwork repress  agency?

LG: To start, I think I would define that term patient agency as a person’s power to make decisions about their treatment and to control the stories told about them during the course of their treatment and after. I specifically chose the word agency, rather than something like independence, taking a cue from disability scholars. Sometimes decision-making happens in conversation or in groups, but I wanted to honour the person’s desires and political drives and needs, etc. The type of paperwork I’m looking at often frames a person’s narrative as evidence of ‘madness’ – madness or insanity are the terms they would use – rather than as a valid representation of what they were experiencing. When a patient spoke, the only time their words would end up in that paperwork was often to prove that they were mad. So as a narrative tool, paperwork really subsumes patient agency within its grasp.

HHS: In discussion of mediation and agency in relation to these documents where or how do you position yourself as a historian?

LG: I’m doing my PhD in English Department—even though this project is historically situated, narrative is my primary lens. As I’m developing these methods for reading, I try to be very aware of my own positionality and follow scholars like Gail Hornstein by leaving room for a diversity of madness narratives. I’m constantly checking myself to make sure that I’m not, for example, just replacing a pro-psychiatry narrative with an anti-psychiatry narrative. I’m trying to create these methods for reading that can encompass a really broad array of lived experience and while I’m doing this, I’m also noticing the roles of narratives, stigma, disability, etc, in how we understand history.

HHS: Why were you particularly interested in hospitals built according to Thomas Story Kirkbride’s architectural plans for psychiatric institutions?

On the surface level, they had a more unified and formalized record keeping practice so it was easier to find some of these archives. Although they were still not especially easy to find, as many of them have been destroyed, lost, or taken up by private collectors. On a more theoretical level, I’m interested in how Kirkbride’s vision for architectural design parallels the way that administrators fashion their own role within this bureaucracy. Kirkbride saw very little distinction between architectural design and therapeutic practice so he thought about how each design element would reflect or influence the humane treatment that he hoped patients would receive. Once the construction of the hospitals were set in motion by the Kirkbride Plan, they were set in the context of eugenic America and became sites of overcrowding and abuse. I believe that administrators’ bureaucratic moves demonstrated and reflected the sort of underlying punitive or eugenic ideology of the hospital, just as Kirkbride’s design reflected his underlying utopian vision of the hospital. I think there’s some some parallel work happening there.

HHS: What was the value of Ann Laura Stoler’s injunction to read ‘along the archive grain’ for your project?

LG: Stoler’s work for me was a really good starting place for working with this material because it teaches us to see and notice how groups and power constructed narrative, as well as the real life effects that those narratives can have on the people experiencing life in the hospital. Stoler provides a starting point, the first place that I go before developing the argument and methods further. Put altogether I think the methods more readily reflect

Marisa J. Fuentes’s approach of reading along the bias grain. Not to overcomplicate the metaphors here, but just as Stoler moves along the archival grain which involves following wood grain, Fuentes talks about cutting fabric on the bias, which makes it stretch. My examination of paperwork shows where these narratives stretch—what’s missing, where patients push back against the institutional narrative, etc. Stoler’s work is a good starting point, but then I move out towards this more elastic understanding of the archive.

You describe finding some empty forms in the archive that struck you as significant for identifying the ‘archival grain’ – how so?

LG: That’s an anecdote I go to because it was one of the first times I started realizing how we’re trained to think about paperwork. I was working on a really tight schedule in an archive and I had this really thick folder of paperwork that I had brought to the desk. I worked with this really wonderful, helpful archivist who scanned the documents for me; I came back a few hours later and I realized she had only scanned about half of the papers. She said she didn’t scan the others because they were “blank.” And this led to such a generative conversation between the two of us in realizing that we are trained to see forms as blank, even when they contain plenty of text. It was this moment where it clicked for me that this is something that’s really worth looking at and something that we’re so trained to see as invisible.

HHS: What key historical shifts in psychiatry were evident from studying these documents?

LG: I’m hesitant to make broad claims about psychiatry as a whole, because my access to archives has been limited to the US and limited to really two or three hospitals. But I have noticed within that scope a shift more towards family history, so in the late 19th century, a lot of these forms were more about the person’s individual history: when they started exhibiting behaviours that were non-normative, etc. And then the paperwork that I’m looking at around the 1920s starts moving towards asking more questions about family history. The other thing that I noticed was a shift in where authority was located in the intake process, the process of a patient being admitted into the hospital. Around the 19th century, so many of these forms just reference the fact that a physician has done an exam on this patient behind closed doors, that the physician declares this patient is insane and that they should be hospitalized, and so the reader of the form is supposed to just trust the doctors’ authority. In the 20th century, these intake forms went from being about three pages to about ten pages. A community member or a friend (whoever brought the patient to the hospital that day) was expected to fill out the form and provide a detailed family history. The authority started residing in the bureaucratic process itself rather than in the individual physician.

How does this essay bring together approaches from disability studies and medical humanties?

I think they work together. In this essay in particular I’m interested in some questions borrowed from medical humanities, such as how medical practices operate, how decisions are made at the top, how power flows, how power operates in doctor-patient encounters etc. But as someone who has come to this from the perspective of disability studies, I feel that we can’t answer those questions without also answering questions about how one self identifies with disability or doesn’t, how stigma and ableism operate in these hospitals and how we can centre the lived experiences of disabled people. These questions, for me, are are part and parcel, they really can’t be separated. We can’t answer the questions about how bureaucracy operates without answering questions about the effects on people’s lived experiences.

HHS: How do you go about disentangling different ‘layers of voices’ in these documents?

It’s often a really complicated process. I tried to be transparent about the ambiguity, about the impossibilities of disentangling some of those voices when I’m writing about the documents.

I work with one document, for example, that’s just called ‘Case notes continued’. It’s typed up but it’s completely unclear to me as a 21st century reader whether this was dictated by a physician to another worker to type up after interviewing a patient, if some other worker in the hospital read the patient’s file and then summarized it in this type of document, or something else. I don’t know how this document came to be or what the process behind it was. I don’t know whose voice is leading it, but it’s written in this almost omniscient scientific voice. I think that the ambiguity builds that scientific authority so that it reads not as the voice of an individual, but as the voice of the hospital or the voice of science. The patient’s voice is buried really, really deep in there. In this particular document, they say that the patient claims that her husband is abusive, just as she claims to hear the voice of God; these claims are immediately followed by a diagnosis of paranoia. So, as I said before, her voice just becomes evidence of her madness. This is significant because her voice is completely subsumed by this medical narrative. I think noticing those ambiguities and the work of those ambiguities is important.

HHS: Could you say more about Mrs H’s story and what seemed significant or intriguing about it?

LG: This is a true story. It is both the heart of the essay and the thing that I was most hesitant to include. The case file that I was just referencing is actually hers—her husband brought her to the Oregon State Hospital. The first forms that we see are filled out by the husband and by the doctor, and they declare that she’s heard the voice of God, that she has religious insanity etc. And then, in that case notes file we get this little glimmer where she says, ‘no my husband is abusive I shouldn’t be here’. But then that becomes evidence of her paranoia. She was there for about a month or two before the hospital received a petition signed by 150 of her friends, church members, community members, etc. These signatures attested to her sanity and to the fact that her husband is an awful abusive man.

What I can glean from the case file – there are a few carbon copies of letters that the doctor sent after receiving this petition to the judge, to the husband, and to the friends of this patient – is that the doctor came to believe her story. He sent her home into the care of friends and he told her husband he should have nothing to do with her anymore. It’s a really moving story.  It’s triumphant, it’s this example of community power, of people coming together and achieving this thing. But it also is in no way representative of most of these files, and so I was hesitant to include it because it’s so spectacular and I didn’t want it to be distracting. I think that’s the limit of case studies, but I think it’s also important to untangle some of the narrative voices in a story like this. It’s intriguing, it’s captivating, it’s triumphant and it’s also a little bit distracting from the patients who came to the hospital but whose voices don’t seem to bubble up in their paperwork nearly as much as Mrs H’s. Her story is important and it’s also challenging because I want to be very careful not to let it represent the whole of people’s experiences in these hospitals.

HHS: How do you define ‘archival excess’?

Archival access is the third mode of reading that I get to at the very end. Other people have used this phrase before but not quite in this context. I’m using it to reference how material spills out over these prescribed bureaucratic boxes. One example is marginalia. I have another example in the essay of a discharge notice that’s written on an edge of a piece of paper, it seems a doctor ripped it off and said, ‘if this woman’s fit to go home then send her home, if not keep her here’. That’s all it says, and that was her discharge notice. This sort of haphazard ephemera I think of as archival access. It could also be something like a patient’s answer to a question that the form didn’t ask, but the patient thought was important information to convey at the bottom of the form. I think archival access is one of those windows into seeing the form as a genre and as a piece of writing. It helps show the limitations of the form, what story that hospital is trying to tell and what story the patient felt was important to tell back. I find it a useful tool for reading.

HHS: Is there something specific about working with the archives of psychiatric institutions that might provide insights into working in archives more generally?

LG: I went back and forth between wanting to make a claim about disability and archives generally, and these very specific archives. US psychiatric archives tend to have vanished or gone into private collections or been shredded or something else, but there are places like the Oregon State Archive that have have really stewarded this history. But those places are few and far between and I think there’s something to how closely guarded so many of these archives are. I also came up against some challenging ethical questions regarding anonymity; I chose to make all of these forms anonymous in my own writing. That was a choice I made with some hesitation because I’ve seen some really excellent work on the history of disability that deanonymizes these stories to tell stories with names and faces to them. I think that’s important work, but the patients whose stories I’m looking at—stories that have been heavily mediated by paperwork and institutional narratives—never had the option to say if they wanted to be part of this project of destigmatizing mental illness, for example, and so I try to honor that and by making all of these stories anonymous.

But a choice like that is a choice that’s really specific to the archive, and it’s really specific to the history that I’m trying to tell. Psychiatric archives open up a set of questions that are relevant to archiving more generally, but I don’t want to claim any of these these choices, like my choice to anonymize my sources, are a prescription for how all archiving and all archival research should work.

HHS: Your essay explores the ‘structural relationship between bureaucratic institutions and disabled people’ – could this relationship be linked to the distinction you make in your conclusion between ‘spectacular, unsettling, disturbing’ narratives and ‘mundane, undisturbed, and undisturbing’ paperwork?

LG: Absolutely. The sort of spectacular stories, like Mrs H’s triumphant story of getting out of the hospital, are few and far between. More frequently we get stories of institutional violence that are made to seem really mundane and so at the end of the essay I start talking about paperwork that represents the forced sterilization of people who are in these institutions. This paperwork refers to violent murderous eugenic history and practice but the paperwork makes it seem so mundane and so unchallenged. It’s yet another reason to look really closely at this paperwork to see what stories are being told, to see what stories are not being told, and to centre the lived experiences of disabled people when we’re talking about this kind of medical history and practice, because the stakes of the issue can be obscured if we were just reading the story that that paperwork wanted to tell us.

Liana Kathleen Glew is a PhD candidate in English at Penn State University where she teaches writing and an Introduction to Disability Studies course. Her dissertation, “Ravings: Reading, Writing, and Psychiatry in the American Asylum” examines four genres of texts by and about psychiatric patients in the US between 1860 and 1940: fiction, memoir-exposés, paperwork, and archival patient writing. Her work can also be found in J19: The Journal of Nineteenth-Century Americanists and the C19 Podcast.

Interview conducted by Hannah Proctor

Interview: What do we want? Simon Torracinta on Edward Tolman’s drive theory of wants

Simon Torracinta, PhD candidate in the History of Science and Medicine at Yale, is this year’s co-winner of the History of the Human Sciences Early Career Essay Prize. We spoke to him about his research and his winning essay ‘Maps of desire: Edward Tolman’s Drive Theory of Wants’.

HHS: To begin I wonder if you could briefly introduce Edward Tolman and say a little about what inspired you to write about him?  

ST: Edward Tolman was an American psychologist who worked mostly in the 1920s to 1950s, and spent most of his career at the University of Berkeley (their psychology building was named ‘Tolman Hall’ in his honour until it was demolished in 2019). He was a member of the so-called ‘neo-behaviourist’ generation, the cohort of psychologists, with figures like Clark Hull and B.F. Skinner, who took up the banner of behaviourism in the middle of the 20th century. They developed it into a robust research framework and succeeded in making it the dominant experimental paradigm – especially in the United States –  for several decades.

I was initially drawn to Tolman’s work because of his particularly explicit theorization of drives. But I was surprised to find that, although he was one of the most influential psychologists of his day and he’s still cited in neuroscience research today, he has mostly been neglected by historians, besides the excellent biography by psychologist David Carroll. But as I hope readers of the article will see, much of his work speaks to core concerns in the history of the human sciences. Although Tolman was sincerely committed to behaviourism as an epistemological framework, he was consistently drawn to phenomena – cognition, purpose, desire – that pushed against the limits of that framework, which produces some really fascinating tensions.

HHS: Before I ask more about the article itself, I wonder if you could briefly talk about your PhD thesis project and how this article relates to your research more broadly?

ST: My broader dissertation is about wants and desires as objects of the human sciences in the late 19th through the mid-20th century, particularly in disciplines like economics and psychology.

Historically in the early modern human and moral sciences there was a lively discussion around the springs of action, so to speak, in which economic, psychological, and anthropological concerns all spoke to each other. For Adam Smith, to take a classic example, the Wealth of Nations and the Theory of Moral Sentiments were hardly a separate enterprise. And scientific writing on the passions, appetites, and desires continued late into the 19th century.

But my contention is that, as the professional disciplines emerged and introspection retreated as an epistemologically valid form of investigation, it was replaced by methods that looked to behaviour, whether found in experiments or prices or anything else, as the primary evidence base for explaining motivation. This led to what we might call an ‘emptying out’ of interiority, with wants defined along increasingly tautological or teleological lines, and a growing emphasis on calculative rationality above all else. I try to trace these developments across several fields through the decline of faculty psychology, the marginal revolution, and the emergence of behaviourism, neoclassicism, and eventually rational choice – and to some extent through dissidents like the neo-Freudians. So Tolman’s work is at the midpoint of these trends.

HHS: How did Tolman define ‘wants’? Are wants distinct from desires or needs, for example?

ST: Tolman had a very expansive definition of wants, which he understood to include all motives of behaviour, including basic drives like hunger and thirst, for instance, but also more ‘sophisticated’ forms of motivation that we might call ‘desires’ in ordinary language. But that was part of his aim to unite all human and animal motivation in a single theoretical model, in which rat experiments could be understood to say something important about human behaviour.

Of course, this was an idiosyncratic definition, and throughout the dissertation I show how other scientists tried to bound and delineate these concepts. The way the terms are defined and set in relation to each other can tell you a lot about a project, and certainly the boundary drawn between ‘basic’ needs and more subjective ‘wants’ is always a political one. Many 19th-century psychologists, for instance, delineated categories of higher ‘desires’ or ‘sentiments’ that supposedly distinguished civilized humans from lower animals (or races). Economists, meanwhile, moved from an explicit discussion of pleasure to more neutral, object-oriented terms like utility and want, and eventually dropped that vocabulary altogether in the turn to ‘revealed preference.’

HHS: How, according to Tolman, are human wants expressed through behaviour?

ST: Since Tolman was operating under a behaviourist paradigm that prohibited appeals to ‘unverifiable’ mental states, his theory of wants couldn’t begin by considering the experience of desire, for example. On his account that would be based on unreliable and subjective testimony. So instead, wants have to be explained through a stimulus-response model, or input from the world and output in behaviour. He tried to devise experiments that would help elucidate the mechanisms connecting a given situation – prototypically, a rat in a maze – to the behaviour it produced. That led him to list of basic drives that, he thought, motivated all behaviour, rat and human – or, as he put it, to his theory of wants. A fairly complex set of mechanisms linked distinctive and specific motivations – wanting to be a military officer, for example – to a set of underlying, basic drives.

HHS: Why were experiments with rats so central to his insights into human behaviour?

ST: Rats were really important to Tolman – he even dedicated one his books to Mus norvegicus albinus – the albino lab rat! Rat experiments exploded in popularity in the early 20th century, as Rebecca Lemov and others have shown, because they promised a kind of assembly line for attacking the major problems in psychology. This was especially compelling within a behaviourist structure of explanation that tended to think about all organisms in the same way. Rats were and are relatively cheap to breed and keep, and they are mostly powerless to resist being subjected to an endless battery of tests!

The maze in particular became very important by the 1930s, because it was a uniquely adaptable tool for manipulating and observing rat behaviour. But whether you were trying to research perception or learning or anything else, you almost always needed some kind of food or other reward to motivate the rat to traverse the maze in the first place – which is what got Tolman so interested in wants. I should add that, for Tolman, it was a good thing that a rat couldn’t introspect – that it couldn’t give you a subjective account of its own experience, unlike a human being. For him that meant its behaviour was less open to misinterpretation, and you had to construct a theory of wants from outward evidence alone.

HHS: Why did Tolman have faith in behaviourism as a ‘tool of emancipation’? In what ways do his political beliefs challenge conventional assumptions about behaviourism?

ST: This was one of the real surprises in my research. Typically when we think of behaviourism and its applications today, it has a somewhat sinister resonance, and its promises of behaviour modification seem to license authoritarian forms of ‘mind control.’ I mean, just look at the controversy over algorithms and behaviour manipulation on social media platforms today. The big fear there is that artificial platform environments are producing ‘unnatural’ behaviour or affect – which echoes a lot of mid-century popular reactions to behaviourist ideas.

As Danielle Carr [the previous winner of the History of the Human Sciences essay prize] has suggested, Cold War liberal intellectuals often felt behaviourism was a dehumanizing, totalitarian approach, which helped fuel the ‘cognitivist’ reaction in the 1960s. To some extent, these tropes have been reproduced in the scholarship on the history of behaviourism – though of course, certain behaviourists did fit the stereotype.

But Tolman is a particularly interesting character. He was a quiet radical, raised in a Quaker family and a lifelong pacifist. Although he didn’t serve, he had a nervous breakdown during World War I, and spoke of a consistent horror and aversion at the idea of war itself. He was actively involved in attempts to connect psychology to social issues in the Depression, and took a principled stance on loyalty oaths in the 1950s that briefly got him fired from Berkeley. For him, behaviourism held out the promise of altering the environmental determinants of behaviour in order to produce a more healthy and peaceful society. Now, some of this may sound like the disquieting ‘utopia’ of B.F. Skinner’s Walden Two, but what’s intriguing is that Tolman was more interested in satisfying basic drives at a larger scale through education and redistribution, and even hinted his vision looked something like socialism.

HHS: Where do studies of aggression fit into this history? How do theories of aggression relate to understandings of drives?

I take this from the work of Gregg Mitman and others, but aggression became a key object of study across many disciplines, from psychology to anthropology to animal ethology, in the 1940s, as scientists sought to make sense of World War II. Psychologists at the time, Tolman included, were particularly taken by the so-called Dollard-Miller or ‘frustration-aggression’ hypothesis, which created an input-output model out of Freudian ideas by suggesting that aggression could be explained by frustration. This really became ubiquitous in the postwar period, with social scientists explaining workplace problems or teenage delinquency or anything else by appeal to frustration-aggression.

But the idea was particularly important to Tolman because it allowed him to link his interest in wants to the problem of war as he saw it. If aggression was explained by frustration, then frustration was explained by misdirected drives, or ‘bad’ wants. His book Drives Toward War, published in 1942, ended up suggesting that the basic drives could be satisfied or redirected to avoid the frustrations that culminated in war.

HHS: What is the significance of the mechanical metaphor from which the term ‘drive’ derives?

ST: ‘Drive’ has a complex genealogy within psychology, since it can be traced both to the German idea of Trieb – suggesting an urge or impulse – and to the ‘drive system’ of a motor. But American psychologists fairly consistently used the latter analogy, which I think is telling in itself. The metaphor suggested that human action could be explained much like a motor, with a drive system channelling energy into particular types of motion.

Of course, using machine analogies for the human body goes back to Descartes at least, but what is significant is how the metaphor shifts as the machine of reference changes. As Canguilhem suggests, early modern thinkers like Descartes and La Mettrie were thinking of regular mechanical devices like clocks, but the motor is really something quite different. The motor created a distinctively thermodynamic model of human behaviour, so to speak. This was what made the frustration-aggression so compelling: the drives were steady conduits of energy that required constant satisfaction, and their frustration necessitated the discharge of that energy elsewhere – that is, through aggressive behaviour.

I should add that even the concept of ‘motivation’ itself comes out of the interest in ‘motive power’ produced by the development of steam engines. Add to that that behaviourism first emerged at the peak of the Second Industrial Revolution alongside bodies of thought like scientific management, and we really see how significant the social and technological context was.

HHS: To stay on the question of metaphors, you quote Tolman as saying that a brain is ‘far more like a map control room than it is like an old-fashioned telephone exchange’ – what did he mean by that and how did it relate to his theorisation of cognitive maps? Were the metaphors he employed also reflected in his ‘striking visual iconography’?

ST: Right, yes, again the metaphors are so important here! The telephone exchange is intended to invoke the stimulus-response model embraced by Tolman’s behaviourist colleagues: line goes in, line goes out. To the extent there is a mental structure, it’s simply akin to the wires connecting incoming to outgoing connections. Tolman became increasingly dissatisfied with the narrowness of this model, which he felt couldn’t explain forms of ‘spatial’ and ‘latent’ learning by rats that took place in the absence of any obvious reward. His metaphor of the map control room suggests that a mental representation of the world is built up in the brain over time: this is his famous theory of the cognitive map, which is still influential in neuroscience today.

But in the article I play with the metaphor a bit further to suggest that, if the motor had become the model of behaviour, then then Tolman’s theory of wants was intended to trace the ‘roadmaps’ through which a rat or human navigated the world. Successful or failed attempts at satisfying the drives altered the structure of wants over time – a phenomenon Tolman tried to capture in his fairly maze-like ‘maps’ of the mechanisms of want.

I don’t get into this at length in the article, but it’s also interesting to note the unexpected ways in which the concept of cognitive maps travelled since it was coined by Tolman in 1948. It gets picked up almost immediately as a key metaphor in economist Friedrich Hayek’s foray into psychology, The Sensory Order in 1952, it provides the general framework for urban planner Kevin Lynch’s classic The Image of the City in 1960, and the Marxist literary scholar Fredric Jameson even adopts it as a tool for critical theory in 1988, with wide uptake in the humanities after that. But by this point its origins with the albino rat have vanished.

HHS: You liken Tolman’s understanding of humans’ hidden motivations to a psychoanalytic understanding of the unconscious – and he also used terms like ‘libido’ and ‘cathexis’ – but how was his understanding of mental processes distinct from a Freudian one?   

ST: Freud was crucial to Tolman in ways that I hadn’t anticipated at the outset. Tolman’s archives show he was regularly teaching American neo-Freudians like Karen Horney and Abram Kardiner, and of course his technical vocabulary was filled with psychoanalytic concepts. Now some of this was part of the general trend of behaviourism at mid-century, which mined Freud’s work for ideas to insert, in a rather mechanical fashion, into its framework. But Tolman’s engagement with Freud is especially interesting because of his research interests in want and desire – and with motivations Freud would have attributed to the unconscious.

In a way, we might say Tolman tried to create a systematic model of Freud’s theory of unconscious drives that specified (and literally mapped out) each link in the causal chain. But as I argue this had a quixotic character to it, which we can see Tolman’s totally weird and complex illustrations. There’s really a paradox in the way Tolman engaged with Freud: he was clearly drawn to the insights of psychoanalysis into unconscious motivation, but the behaviourist ban on introspection meant that subjective testimony gathered together by the analyst in a ‘case’ was totally out of bounds – which was of course at the core of Freud’s method. Once you throw that out there’s not a lot left.

HHS: What were the therapeutic implications of Tolman’s theories and how did he see the role of psychologists in fostering world peace?

ST: Tolman thought that his theory of wants had implications for psychotherapy. If frustration was the outcome of misdirected drives, or a bad roadmap, so to speak, then a therapeutic intervention might hope to ‘correct’ this roadmap. I was struck by the connections between this idea and the dominant approach of cognitive-behavioural therapy today, which similarly aims to address what one CBT pioneer, Aaron Beck, called ‘maladaptive ideations.’ And of course as the name itself suggests, behaviourism was an important tributary into the development of CBT.

More broadly, Tolman thought that his theory of wants could be applied at a much larger scale to promote the healthy satisfaction of drives – thereby holding out the possibility of constructing a more lasting peace. His famous ‘Cognitive Maps’ paper even finishes with a little-cited plea to the ‘child-trainers and the world-planners of the future’ to heed his advice. Looking back, the idea of or even the phrase ‘world peace’ strikes us as rather quaint, but it was certainly an understandable concern in the 1940s. But I think this single leap from the mental to the global shows up the limitations of the thin universality of behaviourist models – which could be applied to practically any situation, but ultimately without much concreteness or a great deal of insight.

HHS: There are various baffling-looking diagrams from Tolman’s books reproduced in the article and you suggest that something about his ‘abstruse and byzantine representations’ gestures towards the difficulty or absurdity of rendering elusive things like human wants in scientific terms. It made me think of how Freud often dismisses his own diagrams as insufficient or inaccurate because they can’t capture the weirdness of the unconscious. But is there something in that impossibility, in the strangeness and convolution of the attempts to create a topography of the mind, that’s revealing in its own right?

ST: Absolutely! I wanted to include several of Tolman’s illustrations because words really do not capture the strangeness – and I hope readers will experience that for themselves.

Sometimes I joke that I embarked on this dissertation because of my own occasional difficulty in sorting out my personal motivations, in figuring out exactly what or why I want. So I find the strangeness in Tolman’s attempts revealing and maybe even comforting in that regard. On the other hand, abandoning want and desire as scientific objects altogether had heavy costs: just look at the incapacity of much of the social sciences today, whose models of rationality falter in accounting for the upsurge of feelings of ressentiment or alienation that are wreaking havoc across the globe.

Your question also makes me think of William James, a hero of Tolman’s and also part of the dissertation, who famously presented a quasi-determinist account of the will in his Principles of Psychology, but then seemed to revel in the sheer contingency of unconscious motivations in his Varieties of Religious Experience ten years later – a work tellingly influenced by his own experiences. As James would have been the first to admit, the strange and the unexpected are also part of the story.

Finally I want to suggest that despite its failures, Tolman’s work might still have lessons for us. I agree with affect theorists that there’s something politically useful about recognizing the embeddedness of desire within the infrastructure of our lives – and Tolman recognized this too. Today, one of the perpetual injunctions of our culture is simply to ‘be yourself’ – as if that had some obvious, stable content. Setting to one side whatever one thinks of their project overall, the behaviourists would have laughed that idea out of the room.

Interview conducted by Hannah Proctor.

Review: Reproduction

Reproduction: Antiquity to the present day, edited by Nick Hopwood, Rebecca Flemming and Lauren Kassell (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018) pp. 730. $125.00.

Caroline Rusterholz, Wellcome Trust Research Fellow, Faculty of History, University of Cambridge

Reproduction Antiquity to the present day is a massive, interdisciplinary and highly ambitious publication featuring 44 chapters, 40 exhibits – each consisting of a short essay focused on an image and artefact – and about 70 authors from different fields including history, demography, sociology, history of art, philosophy and theology, among others. Edited by Professor of History of Science and Medicine Nick Hopwood, Senior Lecturer in Ancient History Rebecca Flemming and Professor of History of Science and Medicine Lauren Kassel, all based at Cambridge University, this impressive collaboration reassesses the history of reproduction from Graeco-Roman antiquity to the twenty-first century from a Western perspective. The volume results from the work of Cambridge’s Generation to Reproduction Group, an interdisciplinary project led by Cambridge historians of medicine and biology, funded by the Wellcome Trust, which started in 2004. This group of researchers have organised a wide range of seminars, reading groups and workshops, and one of these workshops provided the impetus for this ground-breaking volume. The collection is beautifully illustrated and highly accessible.

The coherence of the volume lies in its sustained focus on a set of key questions: when and where did ‘generation’ and ‘reproduction’ begin and end, what did people mean when they talked in these terms, and how and why were their beliefs and actions like or unlike those that went before and came after? (17) This volume traces the transition from generation to reproduction and focuses on the Mediterranean, Western Europe, North America and their empires. It dates this change in terminology to the mid-eighteenth century.  Generation, a ‘looser framework for discussing procreation and descent’ (4), appeared in written productions when authors drew on different ancient discourses in philosophy, medicine and agriculture to try to make sense of the issue of ‘coming to be’. In so doing, they paid attention not only to human beings and their souls but also to plants, animals, stones and minerals. Reproduction progressively replaced generation in the mid-eighteenth century and signified, in contrast, how things were re-produced. This new meaning centred mainly on living organisms and the process of perpetuating species. This gave rise to a focus on population, its quality and quantity.

The volume is divided into five parts. As a historian of the modern period, my review will concentrate on parts IV and V. Part IV, ‘Modern Reproduction’, traces the meaning of reproduction in the industrialised world of the nineteenth century up until the Second World War, while Part V, ‘Reproduction Centre Stage’, shows how reproduction became paramount on the national and international levels after the war and how it was always contested. Since then, two somewhat contrasting phases of change have occurred: an acceleration of the medicalisation of reproduction, which gave rise to a challenge to this medicalisation by feminism and social movements from the 1960s onwards. In the context of fertility decline in Western countries from 1870, with the exception of France whose fertility decline was already in train by 1800, and fears about degeneration, nation-states became worried about the quality, namely the ‘fitness’ of the population, and quantity of their population and the prospect of depopulation in their colonial possessions. In this context, procreation became a battleground. In addition, population became an international and global problem over the twentieth century; fears around population growth fuelled the creation of international organisations and philanthropic foundations aimed at curbing this increase, where population experts such as demographers, geographers, birth control campaigners, economists and ecologists shared knowledge and devised international family planning campaigns (Alison Bashford). These family planning campaigns prescribed the new technologies of contraception and abortion that had developed from the second quarter of the twentieth century onwards (Jesse Olzynko-Gryn and Nick Hopwood); some of the campaigns relied on coerced contraception. However, as the century advanced, reproductive rights as human rights became the key motto of international organisations, which emphasised ‘reproductive health’ and choice under pressure from feminist activists.

In these two rich parts of the book, we learn that the breeding of animals inspired eugenic thinking and that artificial insemination saw fertility specialists join forces with animal physiologists (Sarah Wilmot). Reproduction and sex became separate due to campaigning movements that included neo-Malthusians, eugenicists and radical sex reformers (Lesley Hall). Despite strong opposition from the medical profession, governments and the Catholic Church, birth control campaigners advocated the use of contraception and thus made the concept of limiting births a possibility. In so doing, they paved the way for the provision of contraception that would become acceptable in the interwar years. While the dissemination of information on birth control, partly carried out by birth control campaigners, increased dramatically in the first half of the twentieth century, ignorance was still the dominant frame for understanding how individuals acquired knowledge about sex and reproduction and who produced information on these subjects, especially in Britain (Kate Fisher).

Simon Szreter and Christina Benninghaus touch upon the issue of infertility; Szreter does so via new estimates of the prevalence of venereal diseases as potential contributors to the fertility decline in Britain, while Benninghaus argues that infertility took a modern meaning in the years around 1900. She reveals that while the female body became the object of increasingly invasive intervention, national differences existed with regard to the male body. In Germany, sperm testing was first practised in the 1880s, whereas the practice was rare in Britain. Female sterility was perceived to be connected to gonorrhoea transmitted to an ‘innocent wife by a promiscuous husband’ (462). Over the years, new medical technologies such as artificial insemination, glandular extracts and later hormones and transuterine tubal insufflation became routine medical practice for treating ‘sterile’ couples. These developments and the new faith in scientific medicine boosted patients’ expectations and accounted for the increasing number of patients seeking fertility treatments. Sterile couples looked to medicine to overcome their condition before IVF, but IVF did represent a watershed moment in that it gave birth to a private flourishing new industry (Nick Hopwood).  

In the colonies, reproduction also had a prominent place in the political agenda of imperial powers, and women became the sustained targets of state intervention (Philippa Levine). Low fertility was at once perceived as an asset for settlers who considered locals a nuisance to be eliminated or relocated, and as a problem in colonies that relied on local labour. Maternal mortality was deplored, and childbirth became increasingly medicalised in the colonies and in the metropole. In continental Europe, hospital births became common practice by the 1960s. However, as Salim Al-Gailani argues, the medicalisation of birth was not imposed on passive women patients by all-powerful male obstetricians. Demand for it shaped the provision of maternity care, even when the maternal mortality rate was higher in hospital than at home. With hospital births gaining prominence, antenatal care expanded, and prenatal diagnosis and screening for defects became routine practice in the last quarter of the twentieth century, generating new stress for mothers-to-be (Ilana Löwy).

This volume shows the necessity to consider the history of reproduction from an interdisciplinary perspective. It is a must-read for students and scholars interested in the issue of reproduction.